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1 Postmodern scenario
MacIntyre’s analisys of the contemporary crisis, as such as disorder that does 
not make possible to overcome the moral disagreement, comes to awareness 
that “there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our 
culture”1. In his more important writings, translated also in Italy, MacIntyre 
shows us the route that have lead toward into the actual state of crisis. It is an 
itinerary that, briefly, began rejecting the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition and 
denying its own standards of rationality and putting forward a new standard of 
rationality focused on concepts of universality and necessity. It is a route that 
would have to lead on a sound grounding in ethics but it produced failures.
MacIntyre is describing the step from modernity to postmodernity.
In his rebuilding, the effort of a rational grounding of morality begun 
with abandon of an aristotelian kind of rationality in favor of an universalist 
and determinist kind of rationality had as a result the increasing of contend-
ing ethics theories. Contemporary culture has fallen into a state of serious 
disorder that people have only fragments of knowledge and simulacra of 
morality, people have lost the ability of moral understanding. 
Therefore the effort of rational justification of ethics, that erects as a fun-
damental standard the ability of universalize, failed. And this failure, that is 
the failure of universalism point of view that correspond to the Encyclopae-
dism, has lead to the Genealogical tradition whose implications are relativ-
ism and perspectivism, categories that overlook the philosophical current 
scenario and with which we have to confront2.
* Nicoletta Concu, Ph.D. Candidate — University of Cagliari — Italy
1 See After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edn. (including “Prologue: After Virtue after 
a Quarter of a Century”), University of Notre Dame Press, Duckworth, 2007, cit. p. 6 (here-
after AV)
2 MacIntyrean rebuilding of a disquieting suggestion in After Virtue is a postmodern scenar-
io. He has picked out such elements as fragmentary nature of arguments, the caotic nature 
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Within this new scenario, this new Weltanschauung, it is impossible to 
conceive objective, uniform and orderly standpoint as well as to endorse 
objective ethics values.
The Enlightenment project failure has thrown us into the caotic emotiv-
ist culture in which, lacking objective and impersonal moral models, unique 
to provide the guarantee for moral agreement, prevail “expressions of prefer-
ence, expressions of attitude or feeling”3. 
This is a scenario that shows clearly its condition of uncertainty, one 
condition in which lacking genuine elements of rational justification we are 
moving towards “continually falling” and we ask if “Is there still an up and 
a down?”4.
Doubtless MacIntyre is describing a post–nietzschean scenario5 where 
we have accepted not only that the real, the world in which live, is caotic 
and pluralistic but also that now we live without absolute and genuine cer-
tainties and that without eternal values truth is only an interpretation6.
But MacIntyre rejects skeptical and nihilistic outcomes of Enlighten-
ment project failure and hence this scenario can not be a point of no return, 
this state of affairs can not declare the end of philosophy7.
Indeed the route showed by MacIntyre seems to be one of who, becoming 
aware of the failures caused by that kind of philosophical research, now is 
trying to provide a solution, that is, a new method of philosophical research 
that gives suitable answers to the problems of postmodernism, relativism 
of real, the incommensurability of theories and the idea of the emotivist self understand-
ing as an unembodied self that are all elements pointed out from postmodernists.
 About general categories of postmodernity see J–F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne 
(1979) e Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants (1986); see also Gianni Vattimo, italian repre-
sentative postmodernist, La fine della modernità (1985) and with co–author P. A. Rovatti, 
Il pensiero debole (1983).
3 See AV, p. 12
4 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Cambridge University Press ed. by B. Williams 2001, cit. p. 
120, Aphorism 125 The madman 
5 As for many critics of postmodernism also for MacIntyre the reference to Nietzsche is 
linked to the awareness of the state of crisis in which stand contemporary culture.
6 Clearly here the reference is Nietzsche, aphorism 22 Beyond Good and Evil that is the 
landmark of postmodernist utterance according to which there is no fact, but only inter-
pretations.
7 In philosophy postmodern framework is linked with nietzschean concept of “the death of 
God” that discloses the end of metaphysic and at the same time the beginning of nihilism.
 Consideration about postmodern around the sixties of the twentieth century distinguishes 
itself for its interest to apocalyptic issues like about the end of art, the end of history (see F. 
Fukuyama, The End of History?, 1989 and The End of History and the Last Man, 1992), the 
end of metaphysics and the end of philosophy understanding as branch of knowledge and 
form of thought.
 For more details, please refer to Henry Redner, The Ends of Philosophy (1986) and the more 
recent Italian work of Peter Carravetta, Del Postmoderno (2009) ed. by Bompiani.
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and perspectivism. This is the only way for improving the philosophical 
research.
MacIntyre takes seriously the issues of postmodernism and re–read-
ing the modernity on the light of its own failures develops a new method 
of enquiry apt to solve the problem of moral disagreement that is to solve 
“the question of how the rival claims made by different traditions […] are 
to be evaluated […]” without “relativism and/or prospectivism might […] 
prevail”8. 
In other words he tries to show how is possible to hold in a rational way 
the superiority of one tradition against the rival one “if the only available 
standards of rationality are those made available by and within traditions”?9.
Needless to say his commitment is to prove that his conception of ra-
tionality, the tadition–costituted rationality, does not imply relativism. 
And in this way MacIntyre is replying to the relativist challenge that deny 
“that rational debate between and rational choice among rival traditions is 
possible”10. 
The other issue to which MacIntyre have to give a reply is the perspec-
tivist challenge that “puts in question the possibility of making truth–claims 
from within any one tradition”11 because “no one tradition can deny legiti-
macy to its rivals”12
Therefore MacIntyre must to reply to this two challenges showing both 
that it is possible rational debate and rational choice among contending tra-
ditions without putting trust in transcendent standards or norms, but start-
ing by standards of rational justification internal to it, and that it is possible 
to make truth–claims from within any one tradition.
What is at stake in this argument regarding the progress of philosophical 
research that involves a belief in truth, it is the defense of a non–relativistic 
concept of truth. If MacIntyre gives an answer to these challenges, he will 
have shown both the failure of relativism and the one of perspectivism, that 
is on one hand the failure of those who assert the impossibility of rational 
choice among rival traditions because we can only speak of truth in relation 
to the previously hired schemata and by consensus13, and on the other hand 
the failure of those who support the elimination of any assignment of truth 
or falsity because no one tradition can deny the legitimacy of other tradi-
8 See Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, University of Notre Dame Press, Duckworth, 1988 
cit. p. 354 (hereafter WJ?)
9 Ibid., p. 352
10 Idid., p. 352
11 Ibid., p. 352
12 Ibid., p. 352
13 This is the conception of warranted assertability disapproved by MacIntyre in his several 
writings.
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tions (perspectivism). In other words giving an answer to these challenges 
he will have proved that immanentism does not imply relativism14.
Many critics have debated with regard to the failure of MacIntyre’s effort 
overcoming contemporary crisis and some of these have maintained that his 
theory shows itself weakness, but others that his position falls into relativ-
ism15. Nevertheless these issues have already found a reply16 and therefore 
is not my intention here to defend again macintyrean no–relativist position.
My purpose in this paper is both to display whose conceptual instru-
ments MacIntyre makes use in order to reply to the relativism and perspec-
tivism challenges and to figure out if we can accept his theory as a defense 
of realism than as a genuine form of realism at odds with drifts of postmo-
dernity. 
But first of all I would summarize his proposal.
2 Intellectual inquiry 
According to MacIntyre post–nietzschean scenario developed after the En-
lightenment project failure can and must be overcome.
Clearly in his writings MacIntyre maintains that in order to avoid moral 
relativism we should appeal to a criterion that is able to decide among con-
tending and conflicting moral traditions. 
Since MacIntyre rejects the Enlightenment project of rational founda-
tion of morality that is independent of any historical contingency, so what 
is such standard?
Now MacIntyre has to deal with the problem of providing a standard of 
justification among rival traditions both without drawing upon the proce-
dural rationality, namely the universalism that to solve moral disagreement 
relies on a transcendent norms of enquiry that is the view from nowhere17, 
and at the same time he has to avoid the Enlightenment project failures.
Indeed in his analyses about symptoms of current moral crisis MacIn-
tyre recalls more than once that the absence of shared rational standard 
14 Some critics have endorsed the failure of MacIntyre’s argument about this point like for 
example says John Haldane in his MacIntyre’s Thomist Revival: What Next? in After Ma-
cIntyre edited by Horton and Mendus, 1994 pp. 91–107
15 In the Postscript to the Second Edition of After Virtue MacIntyre recalls that, according 
some critics among whose Robert Wachbroit, his rejection of the Enlightenment project 
can only attain to relativistic thesis according to which “there is no moral rationality 
which is not internal to and relative to some particular tradition” (See AV, p. 276)
16 For more details, please refer to S. Lutz, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre (2004) 
especially chapter 3
17 Clearly here the reference is Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 1986
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implies that moral debates are characterized by interminability and by arbi-
trary nature18.
Just because we should no accept this state of affairs it need to pinpoint 
one standard that can give us a compelling reply to the challenges of post-
modernism without fall into the plot of the relativism and the perspectivism.
For these reasons, MacIntyre develops a concept of tradition under-
standing as a intellectual research that is a type of enquiry that not only 
arrives at an account of truth but also in so doing exemplify just the kind of 
account at which it arrives19. And this kind of intellectual enquiry has got 
its own rationality that is not procedural and formal like the modern concept 
of rationality, but it is “a matter of the kind of progress which it makes”20.
Such intellectual enquiry has to begin from a set of initial problems, 
from some condition of pure historical contingency. Indeed because can not 
be any beginning without premises, one who pretends to begin enquiry from 
outside history or tradition, as MacIntyre says, “is to be a stranger to en-
quiry; it is to be in a state of intellectual and moral destitution”21.
Therefore it ought to start from relevant but not dogmatic beliefs that 
during the process of enquiry can be inadequate or insufficient and hence 
can be reformulated and reevaluated to repair inadequacies and overcome 
limitations, within an intellectual movement towards the truth.
Regarding the development of this intellectual enquiry forward the truth 
is crucial and strategic the concept of epistemological crisis.
Experience of epistemological crisis makes us aware “to recognize the 
possibility of systematically different possibilities of interpretation, of the 
existence of alternative and rival schemata which yield mutually incompat-
ible accounts of what is going on around”22 us.
18 See not only After Virtue especially chapter 2, but for ex. see also A Crisis in Moral Phi-
losophy: Why Is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics So Frustrating? (1976) and Moral 
Pluralism without Moral Relativism (1999)
19 See Truth as a Good: A Reflection on Fides et Ratio, in James J. McEvoy & Michael Dunne 
eds., Thomas Aquinas, Approaches to Truth: The Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, 1996–2001, 
Four Courts Press, 2002 (reprinted in Alasdair MacIntyre, Selected Essays vol. 1: The Tasks 
of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press 2006). cit. from The Task of Philosophy p. 
211(hereafter TG)
20 See WJ?, p. 354
21 Ibid., p. 367
22 See Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science, in The Mo-
nist 60:4, 453–72, 1977 (reprinted in Gary Gutting ed., Paradigms and Revolutions: Ap-
praisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1980; in Stanley G. Clarke & Even Simpson eds., Anti–Theory in Ethics and 
Moral Conservatism, State University of New York Press, 1989; and in Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Selected Essays vol. 1: The Tasks of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2006) cit. p. 4 
from The Tasks of Philosophy (hereafter EC)
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That is a type of crisis that can occur in the history of individuals, in 
the history of groups but may also occur within a whole tradition and its 
own solution involves philosophical and intellectual progress, that is as a 
progressive approach to the truth.
Overcoming epistemological crisis is what allows the rational choice 
among traditions and this is very key point that separates MacIntyre’s posi-
tion from Kuhn’s position and from the concept of gestalt switch, a concept 
from which Kuhn’s position was labelled as irrationalist and relativist23.
These crises start with the awareness that the intellectual resources in-
ternal to tradition seem to be insufficient to solve new problems and with 
the awareness that exist alternative, different and rival schemata which 
yield mutually incompatible accounts and these crises are fundamental not 
only because they make us aware of the error but also because they enable 
us to understand that knowledge is capable of errors and then improvable.
In addition passing through an epistemological crisis successfully leads 
its adherents toward “immaginative conceptual innovation”24 on which we 
can achieve what could not have achieved prior to that innovation.
The solution of epistemological crisis, thereby, allows the adherents of a 
tradition to rewrite not only the history of tradition in more careful way but 
also to identify more accurately the justificatory structure that holds up all 
claims of truth made within it, claims which are more and other than claims 
of warranted assertibility25.
Solving epistemological crisis successfully, thereby, means both to make 
a rational choice between contending traditions coming from the standards 
of rational justification internal to a tradition, and make claims of truth with-
in any tradition. This means answering to the relativism and perspectivism 
challenges.
3 Conceptual Instruments of Realism
Analyzing in more depth this account that I have shortly sketched allows to 
understand if MacIntyre’s philosophy can be included into the realism un-
derstood as a cultural movement that has invaded the contemporary philo-
sophical culture not only into epistemological and metaphysical fields but 
23 Reference is the well–known event of London Congress in 1962 where there was a disa-
greement between Popper’s and Kuhn’s scholars.
 It is also noteworthy that Kuhn himself tried to defend himself against the charges of rela-
tivism and irrationalism in several papers following The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962) and now collected in The Essential Tension (1977).
24 See WJ?, p. 362
25 Ibid., p. 363
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also in scientific and moral one and that it has distinguished itself like as a 
reaction to postmodernism26.
First of all I need to analyze the main conceptual instruments which 
MacIntyre uses to give a reply to the postmodern challenges.
Therefore in this section my aim is to display that for replying to the 
postmodern challenges MacIntyre trusts to Aristotelian and Thomistic set of 
instruments, whose absence seems to make drop his arguments into relativ-
ism and perspectivism.
Particularly I show three key concepts of tradition enquiry that no doubt 
are linked with Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, namely historical 
contingency, first principles and correspondence theory of truth.
3.1 Historical Contingency
Certainly even the less attentive reader has noticed that MacIntyre in his 
writings gives prominence to historical contingency.
Actually his inquiry about symptoms of moral crisis shows that it has 
spread just after the abandon of historical significance from ethics, namely 
the abandon of historical roots of ethics. The research of general and time-
less ethical model that are expression of the Enlightenment project of ration-
al grounding in ethics has led to ethical relativism. According to MacIntyre’s 
analysis, moral relativism is nothing but the evidence how was disastrous 
the idea to build a timeless ethical theory and without history.
Every standard’s enquiry of rational justification that allows to decide 
among controversial ethical issues can not begin from transcendent norms 
and principles but such as enquiry has to start in and from genuine histori-
cal contingency.
In other words within this type of enquiry there is not an independent 
starting point, namely a starting point unrelated to whatever traditions and 
this because every intellectual enquiry always begins from the standpoint of 
such particular tradition27.
MacIntyre is building a method of intellectual enquiry whose reasoning, 
that is a dialectical one, starting from a set of background beliefs allows to 
solve practical disagreement, namely moral disagreement.
26 In the Italian philosophical view for ex. the reaction to postmodernism well–represented 
by the idea of weakness of thought, by lack of ground and by crisis of reason (see G. Vat-
timo e P. A. Rovatti, Il pensiero debole, 1983) has brought back up debate about realism. 
And now several Italian philosophers support a realistic standpoint (see M. Ferraris, Il 
manifesto del nuovo realismo, 2012). For more details about current Italian debate please 
see Franca D’Agostini, Realismo? Una questione aperta, Bollati Boringheri, Torino 2013
27 See WJ? chapter XVIII 
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It is worth noting that MacIntyre seems to follow the basic stages of 
dialectical reasoning whose Aristotle talks about for example in Topics (I 1, 
100a 1–b 25) and in Nicomachean Ethics (VII 1, 1145b 5), that is a kind of 
reasoning allows to recognize truth from false following on from solutions 
of aporias or inadequacies and leads us toward discovery of principles of 
sciences28.
MacIntyre is following the stages of “a line of inquiry whereby we shall 
be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted (éndoxa) about 
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing 
up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us” 29. Therefore 
it is from those opinions that are generally accepted, from éndoxa that are 
generally accepted that can begin dialectical reasoning30.
Furthermore in Topics Aristotle pinpoints common opinions as the opin-
ions that are generally accepted “by every one or by the majority or by the 
philosophers— i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and il-
lustrious of them”31.
These opinions, Aristotle reminds us again, are nothing but things which 
are more knowable to us. But because things which are more knowable to us 
are not clearer and more knowable by nature, they are need to review.
This is what Aristotle says when he explains his general methodological 
point of view that we can find both in Physics I,1 184a 10–21 and in the Ni-
comachean Ethics I, 1095b 1–3, according to which in the enquiry we must 
advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what 
is more clear and more knowable by nature, and later by analysis (says Ar-
istotle) by activities as identification, reidindification, collecting, separating 
and so on (says MacIntyre) the elements and principles become known to us.
Ultimately, background beliefs as are referred by MacIntyre represent 
“endoxal” premises32 of dialectical reasoning, namely they represent beliefs 
on which people are agree and such beliefs are evaluated like as a truth even 
though these premises are obscure. Good or evil such premises are our start-
ing point to reach truths more clear and more knowable by nature.
28 Regarding an interpretation of Aristotelian dialectical reasoning see Enrico Berti, L’uso 
scientifico della dialettica in Aristotele, in Giornale di Metafisica, n. XVII, 1995 pp. 169–89
29 Aristotle, Topics, 100a 18–21
30 See Aristotle, Topics I, 100a 30–31 “reasoning […] is ‘dialectical’, if it reasons from opin-
ions that are generally accepted”
31 Ibid., 100b 21–23. It is worth noting that in ancient Greeck idioms that point out philo-
sophers and most notable and illustrious of them are toi sofoi and endoxoi, respectively. 
For more details about endoxa as reputable things’ please see J. Barnes, Aristotle and the 
methods of ethics, in Revue Internationale de la Philosophie, n. 34, 1981 pp. 490–511
32 Please see again paper of E. Berti, cit. to clarify attribution of truth degree to endoxa and 
avoid to confuse endoxa and empirical data that in ancient Greek are dokounta o fainome-
na.
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3.2 First Principles
Carrying on the explanation of his intellectual enquiry method, the tra-
dition–costituted and tradition–costitutive method of enquiry, MacIntyre 
maintains “[i]n systematizing and ordering the truths they take themselves 
to have discovered, the adherents of a tradition may well assign a primary 
place in the structures of their theorizing to certain truths and treat them 
as first metaphysical or practical principles”33, namely as first principles 
that have had to undergo the process of historical and dialectical justifica-
tion.
MacIntyre portrays intellectual enquiry as a process, as a movement 
starting from historical contingency, from set of established and accepted 
beliefs. In this process one should start from established beliefs and after 
their review by means of dialectical and historical method of enquiry one 
can arrive to give them the role of first principles.
Intellectual inquiry of which MacIntyre gives an account is neither a 
inductive kind of understanding or a deductive one. The former is to be 
ruled out to the extent that the intellectual enquiry begins from historical 
contingency evaluated as endoxa. Indeed as well as Aristotle says endoxa 
are not to be confused with empirical data (fainomena or dokounta) whose 
treatment needs an inductive method of enquiry34. Alike the latter is to be 
cast aside because deductive method of enquiry belongs only to sciences, to 
“a perfected type of understanding”35 which employing analytical reasoning 
deduces consequences from self–evident premises or principles.
Therefore intellectual inquiry of which MacIntyre gives an account is 
one that makes use of dialectical reasoning36, a type of reasoning that start-
ing from established beliefs (endoxa) and remedying to inadequacies, distin-
33 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, p. 360
34 This point is discussed also by T. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, 
1988, especially § 22. In this discussion Irwin notices the importance of induction for dia-
lectical reasoning and he relates aristotelian writings that highlight the connection betwe-
en induction and dialectic. The same consideration we can find in MacIntyre that in WJ? 
maintain that “Aristotle regards epagōgē also as a part of dialectic”, cit. p. 91
35 MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues, Marquette 
UP, 1990 (reprinted in Kelvin Knight ed., The MacIntyre Reader, Polity Press, University 
of Notre Dame Press 1998 and in Alasdair MacIntyre, Selected Essays vol. 1: The Tasks of 
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2006), cit. from The Task of Philosophy, hereafter 
FP, p. 155
36 The presence of Aristotelian and Thomistic elements in the rebuilding of macintyrean in-
tellectual enquiry method is very important and this allows to clarify its relationship with 
the philosophy of science. 
 Indeed many critics have stressed the similarity of macintyrean tradition enquiry with 
Kuhn, but they wrong because they do not take into account the influence of Aristotelian 
and Thomistic tradition of enquiry.
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guishes itself as a reasoning wherein lies the path to the first principles of 
all inquiries (archai)37.
Necessarily this type of reasoning is a dialectical reasoning because first 
principles that this intellectual enquiry considers, a intellectual enquiry 
whose purpose is the end of moral disagreement and so moral crisis, are not 
first principles of perfected science, namely self–evident first principles and 
whose meaning is immediately understood by all38; but these type of first 
principles are to be vindicate themselves by dialectical and historical pro-
cess and they are “evident only in the context of the conceptual framework 
of some more or less large–scale theory”39. 
Needless to say first principles are first not by consensus but by nature 
forasmuch as their firstness can not to be relativized “to social contexts and 
individual purposes”40.
To this regard, explicitly MacIntyre refers to Aquinas and he quotes 
Summa Theologiae in which Aquinas explains the twofold according to 
which first principles are known41.
My opinion is MacIntyre mentions Aquinas in this specific point to 
highlight distance between ancient concept of substantial first principles 
and modern idea of epistemological first principles “of which Cartesian 
cogito […] provides a paradigmatic instance”42 and that MacIntyre labels as 
mythological beasts43.
Behind his defense of substantial first principles there is his critique 
of the concept of Reason that pretends obtaining first principles from itself 
because such as first principles are known by intuition and from such first 
principles every knowledge follows deductively.
3.3 Correspondence Theory of Truth
To this point I think having sufficiently underlined how Macintyre gives 
prominence of both historical contingency and “endoxal” first principles. 
37 See Aristotle, Topics 101b 3–4
38 See MacIntyre cit., FP, cit. pp. 147–8
39 Ibid., p. 147. See also WJ? chap. XVIII specially p. 360
40 Ibid., p. 145
41 See MacIntyre, cit. FP, p. 147 in which he mentions Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae 
94, 2 “Dicitur autem aliquid per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, 
quoad nos. Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota, cuius praedi-
catum est de ratione subiecti, contingit tamen quod ignoranti definitionem subiecti, talis 
propositio non erit per se nota. […] Quaedam vero propositiones sunt per se notae solis 
sapientibus, qui terminos propositionum intelligunt quid significent”
42 Ibid., pp. 146–7
43 Ibid., p. 147
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Now I would talk about another conceptual instrument that he employs in 
defending of his theory from the charges of relativism. This is the corre-
spondence theory of truth.
Carrying on with his thesis MacIntyre maintains that “implicit in the ra-
tionality of such enquiry there is indeed a conception of a final truth, that is to 
say, a relationship of the mind to its objects which would be wholly adequate 
in respect of the capacity of that mind”44; a conception of truth that has noth-
ing to do with the Absolute Knowledge of the Hegelian system because “no 
one at any stage can ever rule out the future possibility of their present beliefs 
and judgments being shown to be inadequate in a variety way”45.
It is possible to clarify this thesis getting back to the Thomistic account 
of correspondence theory of truth according to which truth is adaequatio 
rei et intellectus46, a theory according to which mind has to conform itself 
to how things are, and because truth standard of human beliefs is in things 
that are measure of mind, this later possesses truth only if it conforms itself 
to how things are. Regarding this thesis Aquinas recalls Aristotle that in 
Metaphysics47 claims that “It is not because we think truly that you are pale, 
that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth”48. 
These words say that our mind is measured by natural things, but not meas-
ures natural things. Also in Categories49 Aristotle says that things determine 
the truth of our claims.
Embracing correspondence theory MacIntyre claims that “the mind that 
understands is such that its thoughts not only of how things are, but also 
of why they are as they are, are identical with how they are and with why 
they are as they are”50. Therefore mind conforms itself to how things are and 
conforming itself understands why things are as they are. And all this is pos-
sible because there is an objective reality.
Furthermore correspondence theory of truth also hold up the firstness 
of first principles, principles that are known by nature just because they 
describe the objective reality. Indeed according to Irwin, that displays the 
realism of Aristotle, something is known by nature “because it is a primary 
feature of the world and it is known to us only if we are in the right cognitive 
condition to discover what is really there”51.
44 See WJ?, p. 360
45 Ibid., p. 361
46 See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2; Contra Gent., I, 59; De Ver. I, I resp.
47 See Aristotle, Metaph. IX, 10, 1053a 33 e X, 1, 1053a 33
48 See Aristotle, Metaph. IX, 10 1051b 5
49 See Aristotle, Categ. 14b 11–23
50 MacIntyre, TG cit., p. 205
51 T. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford University Press, 1988
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All of things being so, on the grounding of this thesis there must be a 
metaphysical presupposition according to which “there is an order of things 
and that this order exists independently of the human mind”52 (this is a 
metaphysical presupposition underlay to different realist thesis), and the 
mind conforms itself to this order. And the relationship of correspondence 
reveals itself in judgments, but judgments doesn’t conform themselves to 
realities. Judgments as a secondary expression of intelligent thought explain 
correspondence or the lack of it between mind and realities.
This is to say that “the words that would have to be used to specify the 
content of such thoughts are the very same words that would tell us how 
things are and why they are as they are”53.
4 Conclusions
After having discussed these references, now I have to realize if such as con-
siderations provide an appropriate answer to failures of postmodernism and 
if MacIntyre’s thesis can be included into the realism.
First of all I try to understand if appealing to Aristotelian and Thomistic 
tools leads toward into realism the Macintyre’s thesis.
Regarding correspondence theory of truth is clear that MacIntyre holds a 
realist position that rely on existence of an order of things whose being does 
not depend on human mind, and this is clear because he says that there is 
“a metaphysical presupposition of this view of truth that there is an order of 
things and that this order exists independently of the human mind”54. 
In Truth as a Good MacIntyre argues against who, like Crispin Wright, disap-
proves realism because this thesis does not avoid the gap between thought and 
reality, but it supposes that human being can know and understand the world. 
But in this way the realism gives to truth only a metaphysical presupposition to 
which antirealist thinkers oppose the pragmatist idea of warrented assertibility.
Therefore MacIntyre have to reply to these critiques and in so doing he 
should defend a kind of realism that reduces the gap between thought and 
reality and at the same time he should show an account of truth which are 
more and other than a claims to warrented assertibility.
Appealing to aristotelian–thomistic conceptual instruments MacIntyre 
shows that is possible both to reduce the gap between mind and reality and 
to hold a claims to truth “which are more and other than a claims to war-
rented assertibility”55 and this because there is a special kind of relationship 
52 See TG, p. 206
53 Ibid., p. 205
54 Ibid., p. 206
55 See, WJ?, p. 363
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between mind and things about which we speak judgments. This relation-
ship is crucial to talk about true or false of our own judgments and beliefs. 
He says “What is fundamental to our conception of truth then is the notion 
of a type of relationship that may hold or fail to hold between a mind and 
those subject matters about which it passes judgments”56.
To argue that a theory is true, is not just to claim that it is not possible to 
prove that is not true, but it is also to claim that the mind which expresses 
his thoughts in this thesis is actually adequate to its object. The issue is: 
how does the mind conform to the object? Or, that is the same: What kind of 
relationship is that adequacy?
Adequacy is a matter of causal relationship, a type of relationship ac-
cording to which the objects of the mind are determined or caused by the 
way things are, and so the mind “becomes more and more adequate in re-
spect of those subject matters about which it judges”57. Therefore assuming 
the ontological primacy in place of the epistemology one we can reduce the 
gap between thought and reality. So this decrease is possible only if one 
admit the ontological primacy rather than epistemological one, and if one 
admits that we can know only what it really is.
Moreover this kind of realism that recalls Aquinas’ thought allows to rec-
ognize the ontological value of words and indeed MacIntyre says that “words 
that would have to be used to specify the content of such thoughts are the very 
same words that would tell us how things are and why they are as they are”58.
All of these features are evident in the presentation of the macintyrean 
correspondence theory of falsity, according to which the real objects that the 
mind encounters reveal themselves as they are and when the mind is unable 
or fails to re–present manifestness then falsity appears that is inadequacy of 
the mind towards its objects59.
All of this being so it seems to be possible to admit the coherence be-
tween this realism and the claims of fallibilism of which MacIntyre talks 
on the postscript of After Virtue. Indeed just because falsity (learned as a 
mismatch between what the mind then judged and believed and the reality 
as now perceived, classified and understood60) is known retrospectively as 
inadequacy passed, MacIntyre can claim that no one can ever rule out the 
future possibility of their present beliefs being shown to be inadequate61. 
56 See TG, p. 207
57 Ibid., p. 207
58 Ibid., p. 205
59 See WJ? cit., p. 357
60 Ibid., p. 356
61 Ibid., p. 361
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The fallibilism then is an issue related to the human mind and its judgments 
and not to the reality.
Therefore correspondence theory of falsity might make it possible to 
place the MacIntyre’s thought into the realism understood as a cultural 
movement that developed itself such as a reaction to the postmodernism, 
although some peculiarities and differences remain. One of these is that the 
correspondence theory that for example is defended by those who recognize 
themselves as representative of the new Anglo–Saxon realism (supporting 
correspondence between facts and judgments) leaves aside the metaphysical 
vision. And this point is disapproved by MacIntyre. But beyond differences 
it can be argued that the correspondence theory as it has been shown by 
MacIntyre arises like a reply to anti–realists thinkers who argued that there 
are many rival theories that explain (well) the reality. In other words, the 
realism that comes from the correspondence theory of falsity provides the 
answer to the challenges of postmodernism.
Abstract
 IS MACINTYRE’S PHILOSOPHY A KIND OF REALISM?
MacIntyre’s reply to the failure of the Enlightenment project has been labeled 
itself as a form of relativism by a good part of his critics, according to which, if 
the MacIntyre’s aim was to find a solution to the failure of the Enlightenment 
project, he would have failed. He would not reply carefully to relativism and 
perspectivism. He would not be able to build a convincing theory that escapes 
relativism and perspectivism, “the protagonist of post–Enlightenment”, but he 
would be a relativist thinker.
How can this mistake be avoided?
MacIntyre deals with this issue in different writings and he develops a new 
method of enquiry that gives an appropriate answer to the problems of postmod-
ernism, that is, relativism and perspectivism.
Answering to this challenge, in his later writings, MacIntyre does appeal to 
Thomism’s synthesis and improves a concept of tradition as a intellectual in-
quiry, that is a background within which it is possible to explain the authentic 
meaning of the correspondence theory of truth where the first principles that 
lead the intellectual inquiry have a capital role.
The MacIntyre’s effort is thereby to connect his historical inquiry with the 
Thomism’s metaphysics.
It would seems then that MacIntyre’s philosophy can place within the real-
ism position that it has developed as reaction to post–modernity.
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